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Notice By Insurers of Termination of
Group Coverage in Pennsylvania
Franklin L. Best, Jr.*
I. Introduction
Pennsylvania statutes regulating the insurance industry require
that those persons who are covered by group insurance policies enjoy
a privilege of converting to individual coverage when group coverage
ends. This statutory requirement applies to both life' and health2 in-
surance. An insured may convert life insurance if loss of group cov-
erage is attributable to termination of employment, membership in
an eligible class, or of his policy.' He may convert health insurance
if his group coverage ends for any reason." An insured may apply for
an individual policy within thirty-one days of termination of group
coverage.5
The Insurance Code requires notice of the conversion privilege.
The certificate must include notice of the health conversion privilege.
Furthermore, an insured must receive written notice within fifteen
days before or after his group health coverage ends." The Insurance
Code is silent regarding the inclusion of a notice provision in a certif-
icate of group life insurance; however, an insured must receive fif-
* B.A., Yale University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; Associate Gen-
eral Counsel, The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Mem-
ber of Pennsylvania Bar. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not
necessarily those of The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company.
I. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 532.6(8), (9), (10) (Purdon 1971). These subsections
are essentially identical to a model statute prepared by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners in 1946 entitled "Group Life Insurance Definition and Group Life Insurance
Standard Provisions." The conversion provisions are at paragraphs (8), (9) and (10) of the
Standard Provisions section. 1946 Proc. NAIC pp. 338-44.
2. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 756.2(d) (Purdon 1971). This subsection is essentially
identical to the NAIC Group Health Insurance Mandatory Conversion Privilege Model Act
except for the notice requirement. See infra note 6. 1976 Proc. NAIC, Vol. I, pp. 494-99.
3. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 532.6(8), (9) (Purdon 1971).
4. Id. § 756.2(d).
5. Id. § 532.6(8) and § 756.2(d)(1).
6. Id. § 756.2(d)(19). Although Pennsylvania's health insurance conversion statute is
in all other respects essentially identical to the NAIC model statute, see supra note 2, it has
more elaborate notice requirements. The model statute only requires notice in the certificate.
Pennsylvania's requirements for notice of the health insurance conversion privilege are similar
to the requirements for notice of the life insurance conversion privilege.
teen days' notice before group life coverage ends.7 Notice may be
given by either the group policyholder, who is usually the insured's
employer, or the insurer, although the insurer may rely on the poli-
cyholder for the address of the insured.8
Lack of notice extends the time during which an insured may
apply for individual coverage. Moreover, some court decisions sug-
gest that lack of notice may also extend coverage itself.9 In each
decision, however, that issue is dealt with superficially. Taken to-
gether, the decisions present disparate and contradictory approaches
to the issue. They fail to set forth a consistent rule to guide insurers,
policyholders and insureds.
II. Life Coverage
If an insured does not receive requisite notice of the conversion
privilege, the Insurance Code provides that:
[TIhe individual shall have an additional period within which to
exercise such right, but nothing herein contained shall be con-
strued to continue any insurance beyond the period provided in
such policy. This additional period shall expire 15 days next af-
ter the individual is given such notice but in no event shall such
additional period extend beyond 60 days next after the expira-
tion date of the period provided in such policy. 0
7. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 532.7 (Purdon 1971). This section is identical to the
last section of the NAIC Group Life Insurance Definition and Group Life Insurance Standard
Provisions Model Act. In the model act, it bears the title "Supplementary Bill Relating to
Conversion Privileges." 1983 Proc. NAIC, Vol. 1, p. 683. That provision was added to the
1946 version of the model act in 1949. 1949 Proc. NAIC pp. 252, 253.
8. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 756.2(d)(19) (Purdon 1971) provides that:
* ' ' Written notice by the contract holder given to the certificate holder or
mailed to the certificate holder at his last known address, or written notice by
the insurer mailed to the certificate holder at the last address furnished to the
insurer by the contract holder, shall be deemed full compliance with the provi-
sions of this clause for the giving of notice.
Similarly, 40 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 532.7 (Purdon 1971) provides:
Written notice presented to the individual or mailed by the policyholder to the
last known address of the individual or mailed by the insurer to the last known
address of the individual as furnished by the policyholder shall constitute notice
for the purpose of this section.
9. The argument has been made that mere existence of a conversion privilege extends
coverage, but this argument has been rejected in Pennsylvania. Peyton v. Equitable Life As-
surance Soc'y, 159 Pa. Super. 318, 48 A.2d 145 (1946); Best v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 165 Pa. Super. 452, 68 A.2d 400 (1949), affid, 365 Pa. 418, 76 A.2d 220 (1950). That
is consistent with the following general rule:
The view supported by cases from an overwhelming majority of the jurisdictions
considering the point is that a conversion provision contained in a group policy
does not extend the period of coverage beyond the period of time the employee is
covered under the "termination of employment" clause.
Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 8, 116 (1959).
10. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 532.7 (Purdon 1971).
In Harris v. St. Christopher's Hospital for Children,1 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court construed this section to require that if
an insured dies during an extended application period without having
received notice of the conversion privilege, death benefits are due de-
spite the insured's failure to apply for individual coverage. In this
case, the policy, as required by statute, provided for conversion of
life insurance coverage upon application within thirty-one days after
termination of employment. Additionally, it provided for payment of
death benefits if death occurred within the thirty-one day period re-
gardless of whether application had been made. 12 The insured died
seventy-one days after termination of her employment without hav-
ing applied for conversion; however, she had never received written
notice of her conversion privilege.
The court noted that the statute extends the thirty-one day ap-
plication period to a ninety-one day period if an insured is not noti-
fied of the conversion privilege at least fifteen days before expiration
of the application period. The court then held that in extending the
application period from thirty-one to ninety-one days, the statute
likewise extended the period during which payment would be made
without application from thirty-one days to ninety-one days.
The insurer contended that the statute extended only the time
during which the insured might apply for individual coverage, not
the time during which the insured would automatically receive cov-
erage. The insurer relied for this argument on a clause in the statute
that "nothing herein contained shall be construed to continue any
insurance beyond the period provided in such policy."' The court
found that this argument was "absurd" and that the result "could
hardly have been the intent of the legislature, especially in a con-
sumer protection statute.' 14 The court, however, did not buttress its
conclusion with legislative history or affirmatively explain the mean-
ing of the clause.
The court did opine, however, that if the insured had died be-
yond the ninety-one day period, "then our holding would be differ-
II. 291 Pa. Super. 451, 436 A.2d 203 (1981).
12. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § § 532.6(10) (Purdon 1971) requires every policy to
contain:
A provision that if a person insured under the group policy dies during the pe-
riod within which he would have been entitled to have an individual policy issued
to him in accordance with (8) or (9) above and before such an individual policy
shall have become effective, the amount of life insurance which he would have
been entitled to have issued to him under such individual policy shall be payable
as a claim under the group policy, whether or not application for the individual
policy or the payment of the first premium therefor has been made.
13. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 532.7 (Purdon 1971).
14. 291 Pa. Super. at 457, 436 A.2d at 205.
ent."'16 To support that conclusion, it cited New York law, noting
that "New York's conversion privilege statute is in all relevant parts
identical to 40 P.S. § 532.7. '' "6
The sole Pennsylvania case that the court cited in support of its
extension of coverage was Jones v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.17 That case concerned notice of termination of employment
rather than notice of termination of group insurance coverage. In
Jones, the Superior Court held that the conversion privilege "con-
templates that an employer terminating the employment of an em-
ployee, by discharge, shall do so in such a way that the employee has
notice or knowledge that his employment is terminating," and that
"until the employee is clearly informed that he is discharged, the
employment relation is not terminated."' s Although the result of its
holding was to impose liability on the insurer, the Jones court did
not impose it by finding a duty on the part of the insurer to give
notice; rather, the insurer's liability flowed from operation of the
terms of the policy, once the court found that employment had not
terminated.
The Superior Court explicitly drew this distinction in Ozanich v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,'9 when it held that death benefits
were due because "there was ample evidence to support a finding by
the jury that Ozanich was an employee . . ., within the meaning of
the policy, on the day of his death . "20 In a supplement to that
opinion, the court explained that:
[W]e did not say . . . that the clause in the policy . . . entitling
the insured employee, on the termination of his employment, to
have issued to him . without evidence of insurability, a pol-
icy of life insurance, .... contemplated any notice by the insur-
ance company to the employee .. . .We think the meaning of
the opinion is clear that the clause ...contemplates that an
employer terminating the employment of an employee, by dis-
charge, shall do so in such a way that the employee has notice or
knowledge that his employment is terminated.
21
The holding that an insurer has no duty to notify an insured
would prevent extension of benefits beyond the time provided in the
policy, unless a statute could be construed to extend benefits. Section
532.7 has created a duty to notify an insured. This duty rests jointly
15. 291 Pa. Super. at 457, 436 A.2d at 206.
16. 291 Pa. Super. at 457 n.3, 436 A.2d at 206 n.3.
17. 156 Pa. Super. 156, 39 A.2d 721 (1944).
18. 156 Pa. Super. at 164, 39 A.2d at 725 (emphasis in original).
19. 119 Pa. Super. 52, 180 A. 67 reh'g denied, 119 Pa. Super. 64, 180 A. 576 (1935).
20. 119 Pa. Super. at 64, 180 A. at 71.
21. 119 Pa. Super. at 65, 180 A. at 576.
on the insurer and the policyholder. The statute specifies that the
consequence of a breach of the duty to notify is an extension of the
time during which the insured may apply for conversion. In Harris,
however, the Superior Court attempted to expand the consequences
of failure to notify an insured to include extension of time for pay-
ment of claims. That attempt was subsequently repudiated in Mur-
tagh v. Bankers National Life Insurance Co.
22
In Murtagh, the group life insurance policy provided that cover-
age would end thirty-one days after termination of employment. It
also provided that in the event of employment termination, the in-
sured would be entitled to have an individual life insurance policy
issued to him, without evidence of insurability, upon application and
payment of the first premium within thirty-one days after termina-
tion. The insured's employment ended on June 4, 1979. He died sev-
eral months later, on February 9, 1980, without ever having received
notice of his conversion privilege.
The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas held that de-
spite the lack of notice of the conversion privilege, coverage ended
thirty-one days after termination of employment pursuant to terms
of the policy. The court relied on section 532.7, giving it a construc-
tion contrary to that given by the Superior Court in Harris. It held:
In accordance with the legislature's mandate, the time for con-
version was extended for an additional period of sixty (60) days
and nothing more. This act states in clear and unambiguous
terms that "nothing herein contained shall be construed to con-
tinue any insurance beyond the period provided in such policy."
Therefore, we conclude that the failure of the defendant to no-
tify Mr. Murtagh of his conversion rights did not nor could it be
construed to continue the policy of insurance which otherwise
expired by its own terms.23
Thus, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas decided that
the construction developed by the Superior Court in Harris is illogi-
cal. It maintained that the statute extends the time to apply for con-
version and does "nothing more." The Murtagh court reached its
decision well after the date of the Harris opinion, and curiously, it
did so without mentioning that opinion.
Odder still, the Superior Court on appeal affirmed the Alle-
gheny County Court's order granting summary judgment for the in-
surer.2 ' It approved the entire opinion of the trial court, stating in a
22. No. G.D. 81-33891 (C.P. Allegheny County, January 7, 1983), aff'd No. 00180
Pittsburgh, 1983 (Pa. Super., March 22, 1985).
23. Id., slip op. at 5, 6.
24. No. 00180 Pittsburgh, 1983 (Pa. Super., March 22, 1985).
footnote in its memorandum opinion that "the lower court's opinion
adequately sets forth the facts and the applicable law;"'25 yet, it cited
Harris. After stating the history of the Murtagh case and the appel-
lant's position, the court held, "We have carefully reviewed the rec-
ord, the briefs, and the applicable law. The Act of May 11, 1949,
P.L. 1210 § 7, 40 P.S. 532.7 is controlling. See Harris v. St. Chris-
topher's Hospital for Children, 291 Pa. Super. 451, 436 A.2d 203,
204 (1981). Order affirmed. ' 6
Since the insured died more than six months after termination
of his employment and since Harris extended coverage for only
ninety-one days, it would have been possible to find for the insurer
without offending the rationale set forth in Harris. The trial court,
however, found for the insurer by according section 532.7 a con-
struction that was exactly opposite to the Superior Court's. The Su-
perior Court's response was both to cite Harris and to approve the
trial court's opinion.
The Superior Court's memorandum opinion in Murtagh does
not reverse Harris, because the Superior Court has declared that its
memorandum opinions "carry no precedential weight. ' 27 Without
the memorandum opinion, the Superior Court's affirmation could be
interpreted as approving the trial court's result but not its ratio
decidendi. Even if the memorandum opinion has no precedential
value, it provides a view of the court at work and creates substantial
doubt about the soundness of the Superior Court's analysis of this
issue.
Section 532.7 is identical to the NAIC Supplementary Bill Re-
lating to Conversion Privileges; thus, courts in other jurisdictions
have construed the same language. They agree with Murtagh.
In Preaseau v. Prudential Insurance Co.,28 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit construed life conversion pro-
visions of the California Insurance Code.29 Section 10209(b) gives
an employee a privilege to convert, provided he applies and pays a
premium within thirty-one days of termination of employment. In its
first paragraph, section 10209(d) provides that if an employee dies
during the thirty-one day conversion period without having applied
for conversion, the amount of coverage to which he would have been
entitled should nonetheless be "payable as a claim." In its second
paragraph, section 10209(d) provides that if an employee is not
given notice of his conversion privilege, he "shall have an additional
25. Id., slip op. at I.
26. Id., slip op. at 1, 2.
27. K.N. v. Cades, 288 Pa. Super. 555, 432 A.2d 1010 (1981).
28. 591 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1979).
29. CAL. INS. CODE § 10209(b), (d) (West 1972).
period within which to exercise such right." It adds, "[N]othing
herein contained shall be construed to continue any insurance be-
yond the period provided in such policy." The first paragraph of sec-
tion 10209(d) is essentially identical to section 532.6(10) of the
Pennsylvania Insurance Code, and the second paragraph of section
10209(d) is essentially identical to section 532.7.
The Preaseau court construed § 10209(d) as follows:
The second paragraph of (d) must be construed as extending the
option period of (b) and not the coverage period of the first par-
agraph of (d). First, the second paragraph begins by referring to
the condition of (b): "if any employee . . . becomes entitled...
to have an individual policy of life insurance issued to him with-
out evidence of insurability." Second, the section refers to "such
right," meaning the right to obtain individual coverage without
producing evidence of insurability. Third, the paragraph refers
to the "exercise [of] such right," a phrase that would apply to
the exercise of the option to convert involved in (b), but would
not relate to the obtaining of benefits under the first paragraph
of (d). Finally, the second paragraph of (d) is devoid of any
language similar to the language in the first paragraph of (d)
extending the period of coverage. In short, the language of the
second paragraph of (d) indicates that it was written to supple-
ment (b), dealing with the option to convert the individual insur-
ance, and not to extend the coverage period provided in the first
paragraph of (d). 30
Because the language of California's provision is essentially identical
to Pennsylvania's provisions, this analysis applies equally well to
Pennsylvania's scenario.
The Preaseau court then considered the proviso that "nothing
herein contained shall be construed to continue any insurance be-
yond the period provided in such policy." It concluded that "this
proviso must be read as meaning that the legislature did not intend
the second paragraph to extend the period of coverage; rather it ex-
tends only the time limit on the option to convert."31 The plaintiff in
Preaseau argued that the proviso applied only to "collateral bene-
fits" under the policy, but the court replied that the words "any in-
surance" are too general to allow the proviso to be limited to only
certain portions of coverage.
32
The Ninth Circuit described its approach to statutory construc-
tion as follows: "[t]he language of the statute is the best and most
reliable index of its meaning, and where the language is clear and
30. 591 F.2d at 81.
31. Id.
32. 591 F.2d at 81 n.6.
unequivocal it is determinative of its construction. '83 It applied that
approach to section 10209 by remarking, "We believe that the statu-
tory language clearly indicates that the failure to give proper notice
provides the insured with an additional 25 to 60 days during which
to exercise the option to convert to individual coverage, but does not
otherwise extend the entitlement to benefits." 4
The California Court of Appeal in Daniels v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society35 construed the same statute and adopted the
analysis of the Preaseau court. It reasoned, "Assuming Daniels was
entitled to additional notice of his conversion privilege at the time of
termination, the failure to give him such notice would have extended
only the time within which to apply for conversion and not, as plain-
tiffs are contending, insurance coverage ...."36
Similarly, the proviso that "nothing shall be construed to con-
tinue any insurance" appears in Oklahoma's statute 7 and New
Jersey's statute.38 The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Frank v. Sentry
Life Insurance Co.39 and the New Jersey Superior Court in Wells v.
Wilbur B. Driver Co.40 construe the proviso to extend only the period
for conversion, not coverage. The Oklahoma court found that the
clause spoke to the issue "directly and specifically," 41 and the New
Jersey court held that it "explicitly countermanded" any idea that
coverage should be extended.42
Thus, the construction that the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Harris said was "absurd" and "could hardly have been the intent of
the legislature" has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, and the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. These courts found that construction to
be "direct," "specific," "explicit," and "clear."
New York authorities, which the Pennsylvania Superior Court
cited in Harris, extend coverage during the extended application pe-
riod. The New York statute, however, is significantly different from
legislation of other states. The New Jersey Superior Court in Wells
explained:
Significantly, the New York statute did not contain a stricture
comparable to that included in N.J.S.A. 17:34-32.2, i.e., that
33. 591 F.2d at 81.
34. Id.
35. 123 Cal. App. 3d 467, 176 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1981).
36. Id. at 473, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
37. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4104 (West 1976).
38. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-24 (West 1985). That statute was formerly § 17:34-32.2.
39. 526 P.2d 1146 (Okla. 1974).
40. 121 N.J. Super. 185, 296 A.2d 352 (1972).
41. 526 P.2d at 1149.
42. 121 N.J. Super. 196, 296 A.2d at 358.
the statutory extension of the period within which to exercise the
conversion privilege shall not be construed to continue the insur-
ance coverage beyond the period of the extended coverage which
is provided in the'insurance policy itself. 3
The same distinction applies to Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. v.
Gardner,44 in which the Indiana Court of Appeals followed New
York authority in extending coverage under Massachusetts' stat-
ute. 45 Like New York's statute, Massachusetts' statute does not con-
tain the proviso that nothing shall be construed to continue coverage.
The intention of the NAIC in inserting the proviso into the
model act was apparently to prohibit any extension of coverage,
which is exactly what the courts in Preaseau, Daniels, Frank and
Wells inferred from the language. The 1946 version of the model act
contained no notice provision. The Life Committee of the NAIC
noted that requiring notice creates problems for insurers, so it of-
fered an extension of coverage for the forty-five day application pe-
riod 4 instead:
Perhaps the most troublesome point in connection with the Stan-
dard Provisions concerns the matter of notice of termination of
insurance to the employee whose employment has terminated.
There is no entirely satisfactory solution to this problem because
in the usual case the insurer does not know that the employment
has terminated until weeks or months thereafter. We have en-
deavored to meet this problem by providing a 45 day conversion
period with free coverage during the period. This is in lieu of
any provision for notice.47
In 1948 the Life Committee reported that it was continuing to
consider requiring notice but again observed that "there are difficul-
ties inherent in this problem." '48 Finally, in 1949 the Life Committee
recommended a notice provision which included the proviso that
"nothing herein contained shall be construed to continue any insur-
ance beyond the period provided in such policy."49 The committee
could have simply extended the forty-five day "free coverage" pe-
riod, which it initially proposed in lieu of a notice requirement; in-
stead, it chose to add an elaborate notice requirement to the model
act. That fact and the committee's concern for problems that requir-
ing notice creates for insurers suggest that the committee did not
43. Id.
44. - Ind. App. __, 438 N.E.2d 317 (1982).
45. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 134A (West 1972).
46. Pennsylvania's application period is 31 days. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 532.6(1)
(Purdon 1971).
47. 1946 Proc. NAIC p. 336.
48. 1948 Proc. NAIC p. 460.
49. 1949 Proc. NAIC pp. 252, 253.
intend that coverage extend beyond the forty-five day period.
Thus, the Pennsylvania Superior Court's opinion in Harris is
not only inconsistent with its subsequent opinion in Murtagh, but it
is also contrary to both analyses of other courts that have considered
the issue5" and to the intent of the NAIC when it drafted the model
act. The other authorities hold that an insurer has no duty to give
notice except as required by statute and that explicit statutory provi-
sions establish that breach of the duty results only in extension of the
time in which an insured may apply for conversion, not the time
during which benefits will be paid.
III. Health Coverage
The Pennsylvania Insurance Code describes the effect of lack of
notice of the conversion privilege for group health coverage as
follows:
[I]f such notice be given more than 15 days but less than 90
days after the date of termination of group coverage, the time
allowed for the exercise of such privilege of conversion shall be
extended for 15 days after the giving of such notice. If such no-
tice be not given within 90 days after the date of termination of
group coverage, the time allowed for the exercise of such conver-
sion privilege shall expire at the end of such 90 days.51
There is no case analogous to Harris which provides that as a
general rule, failure to give notice of the privilege to convert group
health coverage extends coverage during the extended application
period. Pennsylvania courts have, however, hinted that group health
coverage may extend on other grounds.
An argument has been made that the right to group health ben-
efits vests upon occurrence of an injury or illness before the policy or
employment ends. According to that argument, the insurer must
continue to pay benefits as long as services are required to treat in-
jury or sickness, even though the policy provides that coverage ends
when either the policy or employment terminates. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rejected this argument in Guardian Life Insurance
50. A life and health insurance text, in discussing the proviso that nothing should be
construed to continue coverage, interpreted it in the same manner as did Preaseau, Daniels,
Frank and Wells and assumed without discussion that the proviso prohibited extension of
coverage:
The model supplemental bill provides that "nothing herein contained shall be
construed to continue any insurance beyond the period provided in such policy."
The quoted clause is omitted in the Massachusetts and New York provisions.
The New York provision has been interpreted to have the opposite effect of the
model supplementary bill, that is, it has been construed to continue the extended
death benefit up to ninety days.
W.F. MEYER, LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE LAW § 10:30 (1971).
51. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 756.2(d)(19) (Purdon 1971).
Co. v. Zerance, 2 holding that clearly worded termination provisions
stop payment of benefits, whether or not further treatment of sick-
ness or injury is necessary. In dictum, the court opened the possibil-
ity that coverage may continue because of the lack of notice of in-
tended termination of coverage.
The policy in Zerance provided that coverage would end on the
date of the policy's termination, except that if the insured was totally
disabled on that date, coverage pertaining to the disabling injury or
sickness would extend during the continuance of the disability but
not beyond the last day of the calendar year following the calendar
year in which the policy terminated. On February 16, 1974, the in-
sured became disabled. On November 30, 1978, the group policy-
holder terminated the policy effective December 1, 1978. The insurer
continued paying under the extended benefits provision until Decem-
ber 31, 1979, when all payments ceased.
The insured asserted that his right to payment of benefits had
vested when he became disabled and that the termination provision
of the policy could not divest him of that right. The Superior Court
agreed,53 but the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and
held that the policy clearly provided for cessation of payments at the
end of the extended benefits period and that such a provision is not
contrary to public policy in Pennsylvania.
The Supreme Court noted, however, that termination of cover-
age must be "consistent with the provisions of the policy," 54 and that
an insured must be given notice of intended termination in accord
with Poch v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.55
In Poch the policy provided both life and health coverage. Al-
though the policy did not reserve a right to cancel any coverage, the
insurer and the policyholder agreed to cancel disability coverage. Al-
though notice of the cancellation was posted on a bulletin board at
the policyholder's office and new certificates were issued to the poli-
cyholder for delivery to employees, there was no evidence that the
insured had received notice of the cancellation. The premiums,
which were paid by the employees, remained the same despite the
cancellation. The court held:
A group policy like that now before us . . .cannot be cancelled
or any of its effective provisions eliminated, by either the em-
ployer or insurer, except in a manner provided by the policy,
without giving such employee notice of the intended cancellation
or modification, so that he may timely exercise any conversion
52. 505 Pa. 345, 479 A.2d 949 (1984).
53. 314 Pa. Super. 529, 461 A.2d 283 (1983).
54. 505 Pa. at 350, 479 A.2d at 952.
55. 343 Pa. 119, 22 A.2d 590 (1941).
privilege . . . or, where such privilege is not given, in order that
he may seasonably obtain similar insurance protection on his
own account elsewhere; further, that in the absence of notice, an
agreement of cancellation or modification . . . is, as to such em-
ployee, legally ineffective to relieve the insurance company from
liability under the original policy.56
Because the policy in Poch did not provide for the cancellation
of coverage which was attempted and because the court excepted
termination of coverage made in a manner provided by the policy,
Poch appears to hold that no notice need be given to an employee if
the policy explicitly provides for termination,5 7 although Zerance
could be understood to suggest otherwise. The inference could be
drawn from Zerance that termination is ineffective if an employee
receives no notice, even if termination without notice is consistent
with the terms of the policy. That inference, however, is contrary to
the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hanaieff v. Equi-
table Life Assurance Society.58
In Hanaieff the court held that the provisions in a group life
policy for automatic termination of coverage were effective despite
lack of notice to the insured. The group life insurance policy pro-
vided that coverage automatically ended upon cessation of premium
payments or thirty-one days after termination of employment. Sub-
ject to payment of premiums, a disabled employee would be consid-
ered to be employed during the period of disability. In that case,
after an employee became disabled, he attempted to pay premiums,
but the employer refused to accept the payments. The employer then
recorded the insurance as having ended due to nonpayment of premi-
ums and employment as having ended because of the disabled em-
ployee's absence from work. The claimant based her claim against
the insurer on the ground that the employer's refusal of the proffered
premiums was improper and that the employee had received no no-
tice of termination of employment and, therefore, had been deprived
of the opportunity to apply for conversion. The court held that cover-
age had terminated according to the terms of the policy. On the is-
sue of notice, it held, "Nor . . .was there any obligation on the
56. Id. at 128, 22 A.2d at 594.
57. In Murtagh v. Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., the trial court applied Poch to deny
extension of coverage as follows:
The key portion of the Court's holding as it affects the instant case is the phrase
"except in a manner provided by the policy." Here, the policy provides for termi-
nation under certain specified conditions and one of these conditions has been
met, e.g., the termination by Mr. Murtagh of his employment with his employer,
MTS.
Slip op. at 3.
58. 371 Pa. 560, 92 A.2d 202 (1952).
insurer's part to notify him of the termination of his employment,
whatever may have been the duty of the employer in that respect."59
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has also held that the duty to notify an insured rests on
the employer, not on the insurer. In Brezan v. Prudential Insurance
Co.,6 0 a group health policy excluded claims for injury arising out of
employment and for disease covered by any worker's compensation
law. The insured asserted that the insurer's failure to explain the
exclusion estopped it from applying the exclusion. The insured relied
on a rule made by the Superior Court that "the burden of establish-
ing the applicability of [an] exclusion . ..involves proof that the
insured was aware of the exclusion .. .and that the effect thereof
was explained to him."' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subse-
quently repudiated this rule.62 In the course of holding that the Su-
perior Court's rule did not apply to group insurance, the district
court added the following dictum:
Moreover, an insurer has no duty to inform an employee covered
by group insurance directly; rather the insurer must provide a
copy of the master policy to the employer who shoulders the
responsibility for transmitting group insurance policy informa-
tion to employees . . . .The defendant had no legal duty to
guarantee that the policy information reached members of the
group and that they understood the terms and conditions
thereof.
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Since Brezan involved an exclusion rather than termination of
coverage, its applicability to termination is unclear.6 4 It is, however,
consistent with Hanaieff, which the Brezan court cited. The general
statements in Hanaieff and Brezan that an insurer has no duty to
notify are qualified by the requirement in section 756.2(d)(19) that
either the policyholder or the insurer must notify the insured of his
conversion privilege. The statute, however, limits the effect of lack of
notice to extension of the time allowed for exercise of the conversion
privilege. Thus, there is no duty to notify except as statutes may
require, and the sole statutory requirement does nothing to extend
59. Id. at 566, 92 A.2d at 205.
60. 507 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
61. Hionis v. Northern Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Pa. Super. 511, 517, 327 A.2d 363, 365
(1974).
62. Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d
563 (1983).
63. 507 F. Supp. at 966 (emphasis in original).
64. Subsequently, in Olkowski v. Prudential Ins. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Pa.
1984), the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that notice of termina-
tion of coverage was required even though the policy provided for termination, but the holding
was based on the court's finding that the policy was ambiguous on the issue of whether termi-
nation was automatic or dependent on notice.
coverage.
If, despite Hanaieff, Poch were to be understood to extend
group health coverage indefinitely, it could similarly be understood
to extend group life insurance coverage indefinitely. The Harris
court, relying on section 532.7, however, stated that life insurance
coverage would not be available for more than ninety-one days be-
yond the original termination date. The Harris court did not discuss
Poch, but its rejection of extending life coverage indefinitely suggests
that courts may be reluctant to extend health coverage indefinitely
when policy provisions clearly end it. The court did discuss New
York authority, proposing that it was applicable because of the simi-
larity of the statutes.65 The New York health conversion statute66 is
similar to Pennsylvania's, and the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court has held that the obligation created by New
York's statute to give notice creates no rights beyond the right spe-
cifically provided by the statute to convert during an extended period
and that this statutory obligation does not give employees a cause of
action for failure to provide notice.
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Perhaps the Zerance court referred to giving notice even when
termination follows the terms of a policy because of section
756.2(d)(19) and, pursuant to that statute, intended lack of notice
merely to extend the time to apply for conversion rather than to
render termination ineffective. Since the statement about notice in
Zerance was made in passing, a court should be slow to draw an
inference from it which would misconstrue Poch or which would ex-
tend coverage contrary to Hanaieff.
IV. Conclusion
Pennsylvania has not developed a cohesive response to the ques-
tion of the effect of lack of notice of termination of coverage. The
Supreme Court in Zerance made an offhand statement from which
65. 291 Pa. Super. at 457 n.3, 436 A.2d at 206 n.3.
66. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221(e)(8) (McKinney 1985), provides as follows:
(A) Each certificate holder shall be given written notice of such conversion privi-
lege and its duration with 15 days before or after the date of termination of
group coverage, provided that if such notice be given more than 15 days but less
than 90 days after the date of termination of group coverage, the time allowed
for the exercise of such privilege of conversion shall be extended for 45 days
after the giving of such notice. If such notice be not given within 90 days after
the date of termination of group coverage, the time allowed for the exercise of
such conversion privilege shall expire at the end of such 90 days.(B) Written
notice by the policyholder given to the certificate holder or mailed to the certifi-
cate holder's last known address, or written notice by the insurer mailed to the
certificate holder at the last address furnished to the insurer by the policyholder,
shall be deemed full compliance with the provisions of this subsection for the
giving of notice.
67. Jakobsen v. Wilfred Laboratories, Inc., 99 A.D.2d 525, 471 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1984).
an inference could be drawn that lack of notice prevents termination
of coverage, even if the policy provides for termination. This infer-
ence would be contrary to both Poch, which Zerance cited, and
Hanaieff.
The Superior Court in Harris glibly dismissed statutory lan-
guage which suggests that coverage should not extend beyond the
period provided in the policy. The court held that section 532.7 does
extend coverage beyond the period provided in the policy, stating
that the legislature "could hardly" have intended otherwise. Yet it
failed to explain what the legislature did mean by that language. In
Murtagh, it subsequently approved a trial court opinion that reached
an opposite conclusion, but it never attempted to explain the incon-
sistency. Courts in other jurisdictions have construed similar lan-
guage to prevent extension of coverage.
The best analysis of all the authorities is that lack of notice of
termination of group coverage and of the conversion privilege should
have no effect other than extending the period for applying for indi-
vidual coverage and should not extend group coverage itself. But it
remains for Pennsylvania courts to clarify this matter.

